The Supreme Court of Spain recognises the power of competition authorities to prohibit contracting with the Administration
Published on 25th February 2026
Penalty decisions may directly establish the scope and duration of the prohibition on contracting with the public sector
The case
The Supreme Court has ruled (No. 50/2026) on the appeal lodged by Adasa Sistemas, S.A.U. against the decision of the High Court of Justice of Catalonia that upheld the ban on contracting imposed by the Catalan Competition Authority (ACCO).
The origin of the case lies in the sanction imposed by the Catalan Competition Court on Adasa Sistemas and another company for a single and continuous infringement of article 1.1.c) of the Competition Law, consisting of agreements to share the market in tenders by the Catalan Meteorological Service (SMC) relating to radars and weather stations between 2011 and 2019.
The administrative ruling imposed a fine of €764,506.50 on Adasa and prohibited it from contracting with the SMC for 18 months in tenders called by the service relating to the installation, maintenance and supply of radars and weather stations. This decision was appealed before the High Court of Justice of Catalonia, which partially upheld the appeal, reducing the fine to €140,067 but confirming the ban on contracting.
In its appeal, Adasa questioned whether the ACCO had the authority to impose this ban and determine its scope and duration, but the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.
The doctrine of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court establishes that the prohibition on contracting is not an accessory sanction under the Competition Law, but a legal consequence of public procurement law, provided for in Article 71.1.b) of the Public Sector Contracts Law (LCSP).
Article 72 LCSP establishes a two-track system: the main track allows the competition authority to include the scope and duration of the prohibition in its sanctioning decision, respecting the legal limits (maximum three years). The subsidiary track refers the matter to the Ministry of Finance only when the administrative decision does not rule on these points.
The Supreme Court emphasises that the competition authorities are better placed to specify the prohibition because they have investigated the case, are familiar with the market concerned and have assessed the duration, seriousness and effects of the conduct.
Osborne Clarke's commentary
Supreme Court Ruling No. 50/2026 definitively consolidates the change in criteria and new approach to prohibitions announced by the CNMC in July 2023. The Supreme Court has now endorsed this model in its case law and expressly extends it to all regional competition authorities, closing the debate on this competence and confirming that the main route under article 72 of the LCSP allows for this direct action.
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